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The long shadow over Fukushima  
 
One impact of Japan’s nuclear crisis is a dim but definite echo of Chernobyl — decades of 
caesium-137.  
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Three weeks after the Fukushima accident, a clearer picture is beginning to emerge of possible long-term 
environmental consequences. The US Department of Energy (DoE) aerial survey of radiation doses was a 
crucial development. A clear trace reaching out 30-40 kilometres northwest of the plant marked a zone of 
dose rate above 125 µSv h
-1
, a level at which immediate evacuation is often advised [can we get an idea of 
what that means in terms of risk?] Already, external doses are rapidly declining due to the decay of short-
lived isotopes (Figure 1).[where is this?] But as with Chernobyl, it is caesium-137 (
137
Cs), with a half-life 
of 30.2 years, that will determine the long-term consequences for the contaminated region and its residents. 
 
The extent of 
137
Cs contamination at Fukushima is not yet clear, but available data indicate very high levels 
in some areas. The 30 March IAEA press release reports 
137
Cs from 0.02–3.7 megabecquerels per square 
metre (MBq m
-2
) at sites 25-58 kilometres from the Fukushima NPP. The higher values are consistent with 
Japanese soil data from Iitate village, 40 km northwest of the plant. Perhaps surprisingly, there is still no 
clear information on 
137
Cs contamination within 20 km, though the DoE map implies that this could be of 
the order of MBq m
-2
 if the isotopic composition of deposits near the plant is similar to that in the area 
further to the northwest. 
 
The implications of these data are far-reaching. If large areas are contaminated with 0.5 MBq m
-2
 or more, 
evacuation could be long-term.  After Chernobyl, long-term resettlement often occurred above about O.5 
MBq m
-2
 (see Table 1). Food-chain contamination will depend on soil type: soils rich in clay, particularly 
illite clays, strongly bind radiocaesium. Bioavailability in mineral-poor upland and forest soils is generally 
significantly higher than in mineral soils. Based on the data seen so far from Fukushima, it appears likely 
that in some areas, food restrictions could hold for decades, particularly for wild foodstuffs such as berries 
and freshwater fish.  
 
As at Chernobyl, ‟liquidators‟ could be brought in to decontaminate towns and villages in evacuated zones 
and to reclaim agricultural lands. This approach met with varying success in Russia. The UK Health 
Protection Agency Recovery Handbook details a range of measures for residential areas, including top-soil 
removal and and resurfacing roads. On farms, approaches include applying potassium fertilizers to compete 
with radiocaesium for uptake to crops, and administration of „Prussian Blue‟ boluses to reduce absorption 
by grazing animals.  
Remediation has some drawbacks: huge economic cost, for example, and the potential generation of huge 
quantities of contaminated waste. Consumers may refuse products grown in contaminated areas even 
when they meet regulations. Chernobyl has taught us that the social and psychological responses to 
radiation are of great, perhaps paramount, importance. 
‟Headline‟ estimates of Chernobyl‟s public health impact are dramatic: one 2006 estimate of expected 
cases led by the International Agency for Research on Cancer came to 16,000 for thyroid cancer and 
25,000 for other cancers resulting from the radiation, and “several hundred million cancer cases...from 
other causes”. But risks to the individual are low. As early as 1991, an IAEA study found psychological 
effects to be “wholly disproportionate to the biological significance of the radiation”. This study 
prioritised the provision of accurate information on radiation health risks to the affected populations. But 
15 years later, the WHO Chernobyl Forum Report still concluded that Chernobyl‟s impact on mental 
health is “the largest public health problem caused by the accident to date”. Misperceptions, and 
inefficient compensation, have led to widespread fatalism and feelings of victimisation among people 
in the region. Increases in harmful lifestyle choices such as alcohol consumption and smoking may 
well have done more damage than radiation exposures. The failure to solve the social and 
psychological problems relates not only to a lack of effort (at Chernobyl, vastly more has been spent 
on physical remediation than on public engagement), but also to the intractability of the problem.   
The long-term response to Fukushima will have to be pragmatic. The Japanese authorities may have to 
rewrite the radiation protection rulebook, as they have begun to do in allowing doses of 250 mSv to 
radiation workers. In a post-accident situation, it may well be appropriate to set exposure limits higher 
than the typical 1 mSv y
-1
 maximum for members of the public. A limit of 5-10 mSv y
-1
 (below which 
resettlement would be voluntary) may be appropriate, bearing in mind that millions of people in areas of 
high natural radioactivity worldwide are exposed to radiation over 10 mSv y
-1
, and that occupational 
exposures (for example, to long-haul air crew) can be of order 5 mSv y
-1
.  
A turning point in my understanding of Chernobyl‟s impacts came while studying lakes in Belarus 
during the mid-1990s. In an evacuated area (about 1.7 MBq m
-2
 
137
Cs), lake fish contained tens of 
thousands of Bq/kg. A couple in their early seventies lived near the lake, eating the fish, growing 
vegetables. They were living off contaminated land, but leading the life they had chosen to lead. This 
wouldn‟t by any means be the right choice for everybody, but I am convinced they had made the right 
decision for them: they were Chernobyl survivors, not victims. 
Table 1 Criteria for radiation control applied in Ukraine and Russia* after Chernobyl (from the 2002 
UNDP/UNICEF study). These were developed for local conditions and are not directly applicable to 
Fukushima. They are not criteria for short-term evacuation. 
137Cs in 1986 Demarcation of contaminated areas by 137Cs contamination density 
< 37 kBq m-2 
37 – 185 kBq m-2 
 
185 – 555 kBq m-2 
555 – 1480 kBq m-2 
 
> 1480 kBq m-2 
Area designated as not significantly contaminated by Chernobyl 
Zone of enhanced radiation control. Monitoring, food restrictions, 
compensation 
Zone with the right to resettle. Resettlement was voluntary. 
Zone of strict radiation control. Resettlement obligatory in Ukraine; in Russia 
it was voluntary if the dose was < 5 mSv yr-1 
Zone of obligatory resettlement 
Dose in 1991 Dose limits based on the “Chernobyl 1991 Concept” 
< 1 mSv y-1 
> 1 mSv y-1 
No restrictions or countermeasures need be applied 
Measures put in place to ensure individual effective dose < 5 mSv y-1 
* Criteria in Belarus were similar to those in Ukraine 
 
 
